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Capital Acquisition in the U.S. 
and Japanese Labor Markets 
Hong W.  Tan 
The contribution of  education to  productivity  growth is  widely  accepted 
among economists and is reflected in its inclusion in growth accounting stud- 
ies. Less well understood is the role played by postschooling investments in 
human capital, such as training or informal learning on the job. What kinds 
of training are most important for productivity growth? Do these tend to be 
general skills or firm-specific skills? How do labor markets provide price sig- 
nals to induce investments in the appropriate kinds of training? What kinds of 
employment relationships and compensation schemes are needed to encour- 
age investments in  skills required by  technical change? Answers to these 
questions should provide insights into how labor markets function to facilitate 
technical change and productivity growth. 
In this regard, a comparison of how U.S. and Japanese labor markets oper- 
ate, and the way in which they facilitate productivity growth, is particularly 
interesting. Some observers in the past have sought to explain higher rates of 
productivity growth in Japan than in the United States in terms of  differences 
in labor market organization, contrasting Japan’s unique institutions of  life- 
time employment (syushin koyosei) and seniority-based wage compensation 
(nenko joretsu seido) with a spot-market characterization of the way U.S. la- 
bor markets operate. These institutions, they argue, instill loyalty and moti- 
vate increased work effort and training among Japanese workers, and reduce 
workers’ opposition to introduction of  new  technologies. In contrast, weak 
worker-firm attachment and high labor turnover in the United States may re- 
tard work incentives and investments in training and inhibit innovation. 
Neither characterization of  U.S.  and Japanese labor markets appears well 
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founded. The culturally based argument for Japan is at odds with evidence 
that these labor practices are concentrated only among larger firms, that they 
are of  recent origin (after the  192Os), and that they arose with the onset of 
modem economic growth. Recent studies indicate that long-term jobs are also 
prevalent in the U.S. labor market (Hall 1982). However, jobs are typically of 
shorter duration and have slower rates of wage growth with seniority as com- 
pared to Japan (Hashimoto and Raisian  1985). Explanations for these cross- 
national similarities and differences in employment and wage practices offer 
potentially important insights into how  labor markets  operate to  facilitate 
technological change. 
This paper presents a model of technology-specific skills that seeks to ex- 
plain why these labor market practices are found in some firms but not others, 
and how such practices may be related to productivity growth in the two coun- 
tries. The model hypothesizes that technological change is associated with a 
greater demand for firm-specific investments in learning about new technolo- 
gies and, to the extent that more-educated workers are better adept at learning, 
with a greater demand for a better educated work force as well. If the potential 
for technical change differs across industries, differences in specific training 
and the resulting returns to such investments should be reflected in interindus- 
try wage-tenure profiles (and schooling returns), which vary systematically 
with the rate of  total factor productivity growth. Given the technology gap 
between  the  two  countries (see Jorgenson,  Kuroda and Nishimizu  1983, 
learning opportunities are also greater in  Japan  and,  if  translated into in- 
creased training investments, should be reflected in cross-national differences 
in wage profiles as well. Another implication of  the model-that  long-term 
jobs  are more common in  technologically progressive industries-follows 
from skill specificity, since neither workers nor employers have any incentive 
to invest in specific training in the absence of a durable employment relation- 
ship. This prediction, though not explicitly addressed in this paper, may ex- 
plain why jobs in Japan tend to be of relatively longer duration. 
The paper also addresses the complementary hypothesis that rapid growth 
itself may induce increased firm-specific training. For a given commodity or 
product class, the derived demand for skills specific to that particular produc- 
tion technology is larger the more rapid the output growth of that industry. To 
the extent that demand growth outstrips the supply of these skills in the open 
market,  employers  must  devote  increased  resources  to  developing  these 
technology-specific skills in-house. Cross-national differences in the rate of 
output growth-over  8% in Japan and about 3.5% in the United States over 
the 1960-79  period-may  account for both greater training investments and 
more frequent internalization of training in Japanese companies than in Amer- 
ican firms. The technology-specific skills and output-growth hypotheses are 
jointly tested in the paper. 
Tests of these hypotheses use the May 1979 Current Population Survey for 
the United States and the 1977 Employment Status Survey for Japan. Both 387  U.S. and Japanese Labor Markets 
surveys are broad-based nationally representative samples of  the labor force 
in the two countries, containing similar information on schooling attainment, 
work experience, years of tenure on the current job, and earnings. To  these 
data are merged industry indices of total factor productivity growth estimated 
by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1986) for the United States and unpub- 
lished estimates by  Kuroda (1985) for Japan. Because information on firm 
size is available, the analysis also explores variations in the postulated rela- 
tionships across firm sizes. Previous studies, both in the United States and in 
Japan, have found systematic variations in earnings and job tenure across firm 
size  (e.g.,  Shimada  1981; Mellow  1982; Hashimoto and  Raisian  1985). 
Though these differences could reflect differential investments in firm-specific 
training (Kuratani 1973), they may also reflect the idiosyncratic nature of pro- 
duction in large firms (Oi 1983) or problems of monitoring worker perform- 
ance that are exacerbated in larger firms. 
The last point highlights a potential difficulty in  distinguishing between 
firm-specific training explanations on the one hand and a broad class of im- 
plicit labor contract theories on the other. Both predict steeply rising wage- 
tenure profiles, though the implicit contract theories make no assumptions 
about training. Instead, steeply rising wage profiles are offered by  employers 
to reduce incentives to shirk (Lazear 1981) or to attract workers with low quit 
propensities (Salop and Salop 1976). Another difficulty, raised by several re- 
cent papers (Abraham and Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987), is in the 
interpretation of wage-tenure profiles. They argue (and demonstrate) that the 
estimated tenure coefficient in cross-sectional wage models is upward biased 
by  the omission of measures of job-match quality. Both issues are addressed 
for the U.S.  case, using information on reported training, and evidence is 
found to support the maintained hypothesis that wage-tenure profile differ- 
ences are attributable primarily to specific training investments. 
Section  13.1 provides the justification for the  technology-specific skills 
model and reviews both U.S. and Japanese labor-market research for insights 
into the link between technical change and human capital investments. Sec- 
tion  13.2 describes the U.S.  and Japanese data and the specification of  the 
earnings models to be estimated. Section 13.3 presents the empirical results 
and discusses the similarities and differences in the relationship between tech- 
nical change and skill acquisition in the two labor markets. Several qualifica- 
tions about the interpretation of wage-tenure profiles are also addressed here. 
The conclusions are summarized in section 13.4. 
13.1  The Link between Technical Change and Human Capital 
The relationship between technical change and skill acquisition is based on 
an  economic model  of  technology-specific skills  (Tan  1980). This  model 
draws upon,  and integrates, elements from the technical change literature, 
human capital theories (Becker 1975), and the allocative efficiency of school- 388  Hong W.  Tan 
ing hypothesis (Welch  1970). The hypotheses are that individuals working 
with new technologies acquire new and more productive skills specific to that 
technology, and that better-educated labor are more adept in this learning. The 
theoretical justification for these hypotheses are developed below. 
13.1.1  The Technology-Specific  Skills Model 
First, consider the notion that skill acquisition is greater in more technolog- 
ically progressive firms. We know from microeconomic studies of  the inno- 
vative process that much of  the productivity gains from introducing a new 
technology comes from making cumulative small modifications in it, essen- 
tially through an intensive learning-by-doing process (Enos 1962; Hollander 
1965). Indeed, the Horndal effect-a  phenomenon in which labor productiv- 
ity increases of 2%-4% per annum are observed in plants with fixed facili- 
ties-may  be a consequence of these learning and innovative activities. If  SO, 
then innovative firms have an incentive to motivate increased worker invest- 
ments in learning about new technologies and to monopolize the new infor- 
mation embodied in workers’ skills. 
They can do this by  sharing in the costs of  skill acquisition and paying 
workers out of that component of productivity that is specific to the innovating 
firm. The familiar bilateral monopoly problem associated with skill specificity 
(Becker 1975) arises here as well. On the one hand, workers have few incen- 
tives to learn about new technologies since skills acquired may not be readily 
transferred to alternative uses; furthermore, such skills are subject (presum- 
ably) to more rapid rates of obsolescence when innovation is high. Employ- 
ers, on the other hand, are denied any innovative rents since new technologies 
cannot be used effectively without these skills. The solution&for worker-firm 
sharing of the costs and returns to specific training (Hashimoto 1979). “Life- 
time employment” guarantees could allay concerns about risky skill invest- 
ments and encourage increased training and retraining as older skills become 
obsolescent over time. 
Innovative firms are also more likely to use highly educated and technically 
skilled workers, especially at the outset of a new technology when experience 
is so limited. This assertion is based on the argument that better-educated 
workers are more adept at critically evaluating new information, and therefore 
learn more (Welch 1970). The evidence from U.S. farming appears to support 
the hypothesis about schooling’s “signal-extraction’’ effects. The schooling 
attainment of  farmers is positively correlated with farm incomes and the speed 
with which farmers allocate resources in a dynamically changing environment 
(Schultz 1975). Several case studies also document the decline in the indus- 
trial  demand  for educated workers as technologies become routinized and 
widely diffused (Setzer 1974). More broadly based empirical research by Bar- 
tel and Lichtenberg (1987) reveal that the relative demand for educated work- 
ers across manufacturing industries declines as the capital stock (and presum- 
ably the technology embodied in it) ages. 389  US.  and Japanese Labor Markets 
These perspectives provide the basis for the model’s predictions about the 
relationships between technical change, specific training, and schooling. Un- 
like  firm-specific  human  capital,  which  is  thought  to  be  idiosyncratic, 
technology-specific skills are hypothesized to be firm-specific only in so far 
as the company retains exclusive access to that technology. Over time, these 
embodied technology-specific skills become general as that technology dif- 
fuses to other firms; accordingly, the quasi rents that these skills command 
also fall. However, firms that innovate faster than the rate at which their tech- 
nologies diffuse to others can continue to generate new skills and quasi rents. 
Thus, this model predicts systematically higher returns both to specific train- 
ing and to schooling in firms experiencing  rapid technical change. 
Rapid economic growth may also lead to increased firm-specific training. 
For a given product, the derived demand for skills specific to that particular 
production technology is likely to vary systematically with the rate of output 
growth. To the extent that demand growth outstrips the ability of  the labor 
market to supply these skills (firms can either develop these skills internally 
or hire workers away from competitors using the same production technol- 
ogy),  employers  must  devote  increased  resources  to  developing  these 
technology-specific skills in-house. Thus, holding technical change constant, 
this ancillary hypothesis predicts that firms in rapidly growing industries in- 
vest more in specific-training than do slow-growing firms. 
Another implication of  the model-that  long-term jobs are likely to be 
found  in  more  technologically progressive industries-follows  from  skill 
specificity. In essence, neither workers nor employers have any incentive to 
invest in specific training in the absence of a durable employment relation- 
ship. Though we do not explicitly examine this implication of the model, it is 
useful to briefly review several recent studies that seek to explain Japanese 
lifetime employment and wage practices in terms of technological change. 
13.1.2  A Selective Review of Japanese Research 
A major focus of  labor-market research in Japan has been on explaining 
“dualism” in the wage and employment practises of  large and small firms. 
Large firms in Japan not only pay higher wages but also extend the guarantee 
of lifetime employment to workers; this in contrast to small firms, where pay 
is lower and labor turnover higher. One explanation for this dualism is that it 
is technology induced. Taira (1970) dates the origin of lifetime employment 
and nenko-joretsu (seniority-based)  wage practices in Japan at some time dur- 
ing the  1920s or  1930s. These practices were adopted primarily by  large 
firms-who  were the major importers of foreign technology-to  reduce high 
rates of  labor turnover (by present-day standards) among skilled workers. 
Dualism exists, he argued, because of  the coexistence of  large firms using 
modern technology and small firms using traditional (indigenous) production 
methods. 
Yasuba (1976) extends this line of argument to examine the model’s impli- 390  Hong W.  Tan 
cation that firm-size wage differentials in an industry increase with the induc- 
tion of  foreign technology but  subsequently diminish with  its  diffusion to 
other firms in the industry, including small firms. For four cross sections in 
time from  1909 to  1951, he allocates industries to either a “dualistic” or a 
“homogeneous” category on the basis of the coefficient of variation (to mea- 
sure wage spread) and the size elasticity of wages (to measure the association 
of high wages and firm size). With information on which industries had pur- 
chased foreign technology and when, Yasuba finds considerable support for 
this hypothesis. For example, the period preceding World War I was a period 
of rapid foreign-induced technical change in textiles, and six of  ten dualistic 
industries were textile related. In later years, the dualistic industries were no 
longer concentrated in textiles, and, in fact, for the apparel and hosiery indus- 
tries, firm-size wage differentials narrowed in the face of generally widening 
trends. Iron and steel, bricks and tiles, and printing industries all experienced 
rapid technical change after World War  I1 and appeared in the dualistic cate- 
gory These findings suggest that firm-size wage differentials in dualistic in- 
dustries may be associated with quasi rents from the use of foreign technology 
by  large firms, rents that  disappear when  technology is widely diffused to 
other firms. 
Research by Saxonhouse (1976) also establishes a link between the nature 
of technology and labor turnover. He speculates that the use of identical tech- 
nology contributed to high labor turnover in the Japanese cotton-spinning in- 
dustry at the turn of the century. He rejects the hypothesis that employers had 
few  incentives to  retain workers because no  productivity advantages were 
gained by increased tenure in the firm. Estimating a translog production func- 
tion whose parameters are explained by variables such as schooling, years of 
tenure, and the number of  trained engineers, he finds that increases in these 
variables had large productivity effects. This finding leads him to conclude 
that the uniformity of technical practices among firms using identical English 
looms inhibited incentives to train workers since skills were easily transferred 
to other competing firms. Some skills, it appears, are specific to particular 
production technologies and not necessarily to the firm. As such, incentives 
to  invest  in  training  workers  are  diminished unless  institutional arrange- 
ments-such  as lifetime guarantees or seniority-based wage and promotion 
practices-are  developed to cement worker-firm relationships. 
A study by Tan (1980) suggests that interindustry differences in the rate of 
technical change are related systematically with some components of earnings 
but not  others. Using data from the  1961 Basic Wage  Survey, a document 
comprising male workers in 11 manufacturing industries for which indepen- 
dent estimates of  technical change  were  available, Tan  estimated separate 
wage models for schooling, occupation, and education group by  industry.* 
From the estimated wage profiles, present values of specific training (ST) and 
general training (GT) returns were calculated for each group of  workers, as- 
suming continuous employment in the same firm for 35 years. These wage 391  U.S. and Japanese Labor Markets 
components were regressed on estimates of industry rates of technical change 
(TFP)  and  a  set  of  controls  for  structural  factors  such  as  unionization 
(UNION), market concentration (CON), profitability (PR), and the share of 
wage bill in value added (WB). These regression results are reported below: 
ST = 8,334 + 1,496* TFP + 677 HS + 525 JC + 4,351* UNIV - 11 
CON -  47 PR -  36 WB -  81 UNION,  (R2 = 0.525), 
GT = 3,917 -  233 TFP + 826 HS  + 7,088* JC + 7076* UNIV  + 23 
CON + 224 PR  + 77 WB - 14 UNION,  (R2 = 0.771), 
where HS, JC, and UNIV are dummy variables for completion of high school, 
junior college, or university, respectively, and an asterisk denotes statistical 
significance at the  1% level. From these results, Tan  concluded that higher 
rates of  technical change in an industry are associated with  an increase in 
specific training as measured by the present value of  specific training returns 
(ST), but not with general training (GT). In other empirical specifications, 
which considered the simultaneous determination of  ST and TFP, this rela- 
tionship remained very r~bust.~ 
To  summarize, extant research appears to provide corroborative evidence 
for some of the predictions of the technology-specific skills model, at least for 
Japan. The issue examined below is whether these perspectives carry over to 
the U.S. labor market and to cross-national comparisons of U.S. and Japanese 
labor markets in a more recent period. 
13.2  Data and Model Specification 
The data used for the analysis come from two sources: the May  1979 Cur- 
rent Population Survey (CPS) for the U.S. and the 1977 Employment Status 
Survey (ESS) for Japan. Both surveys are broad-based representative samples 
of  the labor force in each country. The data are also from approximately the 
same time period and, in terms of  the business cycle, in the recovery phase 
following the international recession of the mid- 1970s. Most important, both 
surveys contain similar kinds of  information on earnings, job tenure in the 
current firm, establishment size, schooling attainment, occupation, and indus- 
try. Thus, the same model specifications can be used in studying the determi- 
nants of earnings in both countries. 
In both data sets, analysis is limited to males between the ages of  18 and 65 
years engaged full-time in nonagricultural wage and salary employment. For 
the CPS, responses to questions on usual weekly earnings and hours worked 
are used to construct an hourly wage variable, W For the ESS, the correspond- 
ing wage variable is created from annual earnings, which include both con- 
tractual wages and semiannual bonus  payment^,^ as well as from usual weekly 
hours ~orked.~  To mitigate labor-supply effects on earnings, only those who 
worked full-time full-year are included in the Japanese sample. The vector of 392  Hong W.  Tan 
personal attributes included years of schooling attainment (S),  prior work ex- 
perience (EXP), and job tenure (TEN).6 Indicator variables were also defined 
for white-collar occupations (WCOLAR), geographic location, and residence 
in metropolitan areas. A common definition of firm size was used in both data 
sets: small firms with less than 100 employees, medium-size firms with 100- 
999 employees, and large firms with over 1,000 workers. The CPS also con- 
tained information on union membership not found in the Employment Status 
Measures of industry rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth esti- 
mated by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1986) for the United States and 
by Kuroda (1985) for Japan are merged into the two data sets by industry of 
current employment.’ The U.S. TFP series is for the 1966-79  period and that 
for Japan for the  1966-77  period. These measures have several advantages 
over alternative proxies for technical change. First, both measures of technical 
change derive from a common methodological approach, which  facilitates 
comparison of  their effects on earnings across countries.  Second, because 
these measures already adjust for changes in the quality of human capital in- 
puts, the estimated correlations between technical change and the returns to 
technology-specific skills can be interpreted as reflecting the relationships of 
interest rather than a spurious correlation between wages and labor quality in 
the unadjusted technical change measure. 
Two other industry attributes are merged into the data by industry of current 
employment: rate  of  output  growth  (IGR) and  output variability  (IVAR). 
Separate regressions of output on a quadratic specification of  time were run 
for each two-digit industry, using  annual output data for the United States 
(1960-79)  and Japan (1960-77).  The coefficient of the linear trend variable is 
used as a measure of output growth; the mean squared error of the regression 
is used as a proxy for the degree of  cyclical variability around trend output 
growth. Though not central to the major thrust of this paper, IVAR is used to 
control for possible compensating wage effects for employment in industries 
with predictably high cyclical output variability. 
Table  13.1 summarizes some of the variables of  interest for the U.S. and 
Japan, both  for the aggregate sample and separately by  firm size.  Several 
cross-national differences are noteworthy. First, the sample of  U. S. workers 
have more schooling (about two extra years), they spend approximately the 
same amount of time working for other firms prior to joining the current em- 
ployer, and on average they have shorter job tenure. The Japanese sample is 
older, possibly because those who were not working full-time full-year (pre- 
dominantly youth) were dropped from the sample (see sample selection crite- 
ria). For this sample, however, the fraction of total work experience spent in 
the current firm  (job tenure  divided by  total  work  experience) is  slightly 
higher in Japan than in the United States. Second, for both countries, workers 
in  large  firms  are  characterized  by  higher  average  schooling attainment, 
longer job tenure,  and a smaller fraction of  total work experience spent in 
Survey. 393  US.  and Japanese Labor Markets 
lsble 13.1  Comparisons of  Worker and Industry Attributes in the United States 
and Japan by Firm Size 
Worker and Industry  Aggregate  Small  Medium  Large 
Characteristics  Sample  Firms  Firms  Firms 
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Note: TFF'  = Industry total factor productivity growth; IGR  = industry output growth; IVAR  = 
industry output variability. 
previous jobs. Finally, note that the average industry rate of technical change 
imputed to individuals rises with firm size in both countries, suggesting that 
industries with high rates of technical change tend on average to be made up 
of a higher proportion of  larger firms. In contrast, rapidly growing industries 
appear to have a disproportionately  higher proportion of smaller firms. 
13.2.1  The Wage Model 
The technology-specific skills hypothesis may be tested using an expanded 
specification of  the conventional cross-sectional wage model. Consider the 
following wage model where, for expositional simplicity, quadratic experi- 
ence terms are suppressed (these, and other interacted terms, are included in 
the empirical analysis): 
lnW, = a1  + a,S, + a,EXPi + a,TEN,, 
where for individual i,  1nW  = logarithm of  hourly wages, S = years of 
schooling, TEN = years of tenure with the current employer, and EXP = 
years of previous labor-market experience, defined as age minus S minus 6 
less years of current job tenure. 
This specification of the wage model has been used by  a number of recent 
studies to decompose earnings into the returns to specific and general skill 
components (Chapman and Tan 1980; Mincer and Jovanovic 1981). The ratio- 
nale is that, when skills are completely general, no distinction need be made 394  Honp: W.  Tan 
about where experience is acquired and general training returns are adequately 
captured by the coefficient of total labor market experience, EXP + TEN. On 
the other hand, if  specific training increases a worker’s productivity more in 
the current firm than elsewhere, the two experience measures should be en- 
tered separately. The added wage effects of  TEN over and beyond those of 
EXP (i.e., a, -  a3)  may be interpreted as reflecting the returns to firm-specific 
training on the current job.8 
Equalization of the present values of  training costs and returns requires an 
inverse relationship between  initial  wages  and  subsequent rates  of  wage 
growth with tenure. Since investments in specific training are hypothesized to 
increase with technical change (TFP), the model predicts that starting wages 
are negatively related to TFP while wage-tenure profiles are positively related 
to TFP.  Furthermore, controlling for TFP growth, investments in  specific- 
training are predicted to increase with the rate of  output growth (IGR) so a 
similar pattern of lower starting wages and higher rate of wage-tenure growth 
varying with IGR is predicted. Finally, the proposition that schooling returns 
increase with TFP is tested in a straightforward fashion through an interaction 
term between schooling and the rate of technical change, S  X  TFP. 
The following wage specification, where general training returns are con- 
strained to be equal across firms, permits tests of these predictions: 
(2) InW,,  = p, + p,S,  + p,S,xTFP, + P,EXP,  + P,TEN,  + P,TFP,  + 
P,TFP,  xTEN, + P,IGR,  + PJGR, x TEN,, 
where j subscripts industry and i the individual. The technology-specific skills 
hypothesis is supported if firms experiencing rapid technical change have low 
starting wages (negative p,),  higher rates of wage growth with tenure (positive 
p,)  coefficients, and a corresponding pattern of wage effects for output growth 
(negative p8  and positive p,).  Furthermore, a positive coefficient on the inter- 
action between schooling and TFP (&)  would provide support for the “allo- 
cative efficiency of schooling” hypothesis. 
13.3  The Empirical Findings 
Two specifications of a log-linear wage model are estimated, where the log- 
arithm of hourly wages (one U.S. dollar or 100 Yen  for Japan) is related to a 
common set of regressors in each country. In specification (l),  these include 
years of  schooling, quadratic forms of  prior work experience, and years of 
tenure with the current firm, an interaction between prior experience and ten- 
~re,~  controls for firm size, union membership (United States only), occupa- 
tion and location. Specification (2)  adds industry estimates of total factor pro- 
ductivity growth (TFP) and their interactions with schooling and job tenure, 
output growth (IGR) and IGR interacted with job tenure, and a control for the 
degree of industry output variability (IVAR). 
Table  13.2 reports the results of  estimating these ordinary least squares 395  U.S.  and Japanese Labor Markets 
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(OLS) wage models for the two countries. The estimated coefficients of  spec- 
ification (1) are broadly similar in the two countries and resemble those re- 
ported elsewhere in the literature (e.g., see Hashimoto and Raisian  1985). 
Generally, they suggest a pattern of  wage growth increasing with schooling 
attainment and with both prior work experience and years of  tenure. In both 
countries, tenure on the current job is on average rewarded more highly than 396  Hong W.  Tan 
prior work experience, a result we interpret as tentative evidence for the pres- 
ence of firm-specific training. 
Nonetheless, hourly wages in the two countries differ in several important 
respects. First, Japanese firms appear to reward education more highly than 
U.S. firms (5% vs. 4%).  Second, both measures of work experience are asso- 
ciated with more rapid wage increases in Japan than in the United States- 
4.4% versus 3.0%  for outside experience, 6.3%  versus 4.3% for job tenure, 
respectively. These results imply not only greater skill investments (both gen- 
eral and firm specific) in Japan than in the United States, but also a greater 
firm-specific component in Japanese training. To see this latter point, note that 
the relative returns to tenure and prior work experience are 1.43 (.063/.044) 
in  Japan and  1.38 (.043/.031) in the  United States. Finally, hourly wages 
across firm  size are much  more highly differentiated in Japan than in  the 
United States. Comparing the largest firm size (over  1,000 employees) to 
small firms employing less than  100 workers (the omitted category), large 
employers in Japan pay  wages that are over 30% higher; the corresponding 
figure in the United States is about 16%. (Results are reported separately by 
firm size in table 13.4  below.) 
The second wage model addresses the issue of whether interindustry wage- 
tenure profiles vary systematically with the industry rate of TFP growth and 
IGR. As hypothesized, higher industry rates of  technical change are asso- 
ciated with lower starting pay  (as measured by  the coefficient of  TFP) and 
higher rates of  wage growth with job tenure (coefficient of tenure interacted 
with TFP). Controlling for TFP, industry wage-tenure profiles also appear to 
vary systematically with  IGR, with  lower starting pay  and higher rates of 
wage growth with tenure in rapidly growing industries. The estimated param- 
eters for the U.S.  sample are statistically significant at conventional levels; 
while individual parameters for Japan attain statistical significance, the rela- 
tionships of interest are not measured very precisely. The interaction between 
schooling and technical change is also positive and statistically significant for 
the U.S. sample, which is consistent with the “allocative efficiency” hypothe- 
sis. It is interesting that no support for this hypothesis is found for Japan- 
while positive, the coefficient of  S  interacted with TFP is  not  statistically 
different from zero. We  speculate that this result may  reflect the relatively 
unspecialized nature of public education in Japan or, alternatively, the greater 
emphasis placed on  team production in which individual contributions (of 
more educated workers) are not easily identified. 
Table 13.3  provides a convenient summary of the estimated results by com- 
paring the predicted wage-tenure profiles under several different assumptions 
about TFP and IGR. A convenient starting point is at the mean level of TFP 
and IGR (case 1). Ignoring the quadratic term (which is very similar in both 
countries), the  steeper wage-tenure profile in  Japan implies that Japanese 
companies on average invest over 50% (5.22/3.29) more in  their workers’ 
specific training than their American counterparts. For the United States, a 397  U.S. and Japanese Labor Markets 
Table 13.3  Predicted Wage-Tenure Profiles in the United States and Japan for 
Alternative TFP and Output (IGR) Growth Assumptions 
~~~ 
Mean TFP 
Country/Wage-tenure growth  and IGR  1 SD, TFP Increase  1 SD, IGR Increase 
profile  (1)  (2)  (3) 
United States 
Intercepta  1.9818  1.9237  1.9343 
Linear wage growth  ,0329  .0384  ,0367 
Quadratic term  -  .00081  -  ,00087  -  ,00084 
Intercept  -  ,3349  -  ,3503  -  ,3632 
Linear wage growth  ,0522  ,0549  .0537 
Japan 
Quadratic term  -  ,0009  -  .oO09  -  ,0009 
Source: Table 13.2 above. 
Nore: SD = standard deviation. 
‘Excluding tenure and its interactions with TFP and IGR, the intercept is evaluated at the sample 
means of the explanatory variables, plus half the standard error of log(hour1y wage). 
standard deviation increase in TFP (case 2) is associated with a steepening of 
tenure-wage growth from 3.29% to 3.84%; a standard deviation increase in 
output growth (case 3) increases wage growth to 3.67%. The corresponding 
increases in  Japanese firms are, at best, marginal given the poor fit of  the 
model. Part of  the reason for this, as we  shall see below,  is attributable to 
aggregation across firm size in the Japanese sample. 
Table 13.4 presents separate estimates of equation (2) for the three firm size 
groups in the two countries. Though qualitatively similar to the previous re- 
sults, several systematic differences across firm sizes and between countries 
are noteworthy. First, consider the returns to schooling. Large firms in both 
countries reward schooling more highly than small firms-in  going from the 
smallest to the largest firm size category, the returns to schooling increase 
from 4.3% to 5.0% in the United States, and from 4.3% to 5.7% in Japan. 
Second, like the previous results, a systematic  effect of TFP growth on school- 
ing is found in  the United States but never in Japan. Furthermore, in U.S. 
industries characterized by  rapid TFP growth, highly educated workers in 
large firms are paid more than “similar” employees in small firms. To see this, 
compare the S  x  TFP coefficient in  large firms (1.2%) and  in  small firms 
(.05%). Third, wage-tenure profiles in small U.S. firms appear to be steeper 
than those in large firms (4.5% vs. 3.3%), a difference that is further amplified 
in  industries with high TFP growth (the tenure-TFP interaction is .0075 in 
small firms and .0033 in large firms). In contrast, the tenure-TFP coefficients 
only attain statistical significance for the largest firm-size category in Japan. 
Finally, the effects of output growth, IGR, on wage-tenure profiles are most 
pronounced (and statistically significant) for medium-size and large firms in 
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Table 13.4  Wage Regressions for the United State and Japan by Firm Size 
U.S.  Japan 









TFP x  S 
TFP 
TFP X  tenure 
TFP X  tenure2 
IGR 
IGR  X  tenure 







-  .o006 
(12.56) 
-  .0012 
(1  1.85) 
.045 
(10.31) 










-  ,0002 
(3.67) 












-  ,0005 
(7.62) 














-  .0001 
(1.10) 












-  .0005 
(4.86) 














-  ,0001 
-  .0373 




-  .oooo 
(1.08) 
.3239 





-  ,0007 
(20.01) 




-  ,0008 
(6.73) 






-  ,0003 
.m 
(1.16) 













-  .o008 
(15.55) 
-  .0015 
(13.52) 
.06  1 
(1 1.41) 
-  ,0007 
(5.12) 
-  ,312 
(1.01) 





-  .o001 
(1.72) 













-  ,0008 
-  ,0015 
(  16.30) 
.05 I 
(1  I .28) 










-  .oooo 
(1.23) 




-  .o001 
(2.38) 
,5034 
Note:  Region, metropolitan residence, occupation,  and union (U.S. only) controls included but 
not reported above. Dependent variable is log(hour1y wage). 
Absolute value of ?-statistics are in parentheses. 
To  summarize, on the most general level these results suggest that firms in 
technologically progressive industries invest more in their workers’ specific 
skills,  and that  Japanese firms on average invest more heavily  in training 
workers than do their American counterparts. These results appear to stem 
from  two  sources-from  increased  skill  investments in  industries where 
learning possibilities are greater; and, for a given technology, from increased 
specific-training investments induced by rapid output growth. 
The firm-size comparisons suggest some intriguing differences between the 
United States and Japan. Taken together, the estimated partial effects of TFP 
and IGR on wage-tenure growth suggest that specific-training investments in 399  U.S. and Japanese Labor Markets 
small U.S.  firms are more responsive to technological possibilities, while 
training decisions in  larger firms are driven more by  output growth, given 
existing technology. In Japan, on the other hand, both factors are operative 
but only in the largest firm size category. In small Japanese firms, some part 
of training appears to be firm-specific, but it is neither related to TFP nor IGR. 
Small Japanese firms’ use of technologically standardized machinery, or reli- 
ance on large firms for technical expertise (many are subcontractors to large 
firms), may mean that small Japanese firms invest relatively little in new, more 
productive skills of the kind that are related to technical change. 
13.3.1  What Do These Earnings Differences Reflect? 
The previous results, while suggestive, are nonetheless subject to two qual- 
ifications. First,  do steeply rising wage-tenure profiles really reflect  firm- 
specific training or are they the outcome of wage incentive schemes suggested 
by implicit contract theories that make no assumptions about training? Sec- 
ond, are wage-tenure effects a meaningful measure of specific training returns 
or simply a statistical artifact of an omitted firm-worker match variable in a 
cross-sectional wage equation? These two qualifications are addressed below. 
Specific Training and Implicit Contract Interpretations 
The problem of distinguishing between the firm-specific training and recent 
implicit contract theories has been noted by Parsons (1986) and others. These 
models share a common feature: they predict rapid growth of  wages in the 
current firm relative to opportunity wages elsewhere. Denote this pattern of 
relative wage growth with tenure f by  W(t).  In one approach, workers forgo 
high initial wages to invest in firm-specific training that only increases their 
productivity, VMP(t),  and future wages, W(t),  in the current firm. Since both 
firms and workers share initial specific training costs, subsequent returns are 
also shared so that W(t)  < VMP(t).  In the agency and self-selection models, 
employers initially pay workers less than their value-marginal product but of- 
fer them wage-tenure profiles that are steeper than their productivity growth, 
that is, W(t)  >  VMP(t).  Such back loading of wages relative to spot marginal 
product serves to reduce incentives to shirk (Lazear 1981) or to attract workers 
with  low  quit propensities (Salop and Salop  1976). If  early job separation 
occurs,  workers forfeit the  difference between their  initial value-marginal 
product and wage; in effect, workers post a bond guaranteeing their nonshirk- 
ing on the job or their employment stability. In these models, then, W(t)  grows 
with years of tenure even if VMP(r)  is constant over time. Individual data on 
W(t)  and VMP(t)  needed to distinguish between the competing-  theories are 
rarely available to the analyst. 
An  alternative way  of  empirically distinguishing between the competing 
models is with data on worker training. If a positive association between com- 
pany training and TFP growth is found, we may,  given the previous results, 
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wage-tenure profiles in high TFP industries. For the United States, we  can 
draw upon the findings of a recent study of the determinants of private-sector 
training by  Lillard and Tan (1986). Using self-reported measures of training 
in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of young men and mature men, 
they estimated separate probit models of the likelihood of training from com- 
pany training programs, business and technical schools, and miscellaneous 
other sources. Each probit model included a common set of  regressors on 
schooling, race, labor force experience, the industry rate of  technical change, 
and labor-market conditions.  lo The TFP variable was interacted with five lev- 
els of schooling attainment to allow different technical change effects on the 
likelihood of training for more and less educated workers. 
Table 13.5 reports selected results for the effects of technical change on the 
likelihood of  training from each source, holding other factors constant. For 
both the young men and mature men samples, company training was signifi- 
cantly  more  prevalent in  industries characterized by  higher rates  of  TFP 
growth, especially among the more highly educated. In contrast, the likeli- 
hood of training outside the firm of current employment-from  business and 
technical schools and miscellaneous other sources-was  lower in high TFP 
industries, with the more educated being significantly less likely to get such 
training. These results are consistent with the view that rapid technical change 
leads to increased reliance on in-house training, possibly because technology- 
Table 13.5  Effects of Technical Change on the Probability of Training: NLS 
Young Men and Mature Men 
Industry TFP  Source of  Training 
Growth and 
Schooling  Company  Business and Technical  Other 
Interaction  Training  Schools  Sources 
A. NLS young men 
<12 years  4.250  18.005**  7.035 
12 years  1.250  -4.796*  -5.062* 
13-15  years  .283  -  3.219  -  7.542** 
16 years  9.866**  -  6.554  -8.612* 
16+ years  16.877**  0.302  -  13.354** 
B. NLS mature men 
<  12 years  ,767  6.104  -  .554 
12 years  -  5.916  8.708  -3.273 
13-15  years  -  1.232  -  6.039  -  17.600** 
16 years  -4.346  -  17.591  -  15.266** 
16+ years  32.1  11**  -  16.564  -5.786 
Source: Lillare and Tan (1986), table 3.6. 
Note:  TFF' indices are from Gollop and Jorgenson (1 980). 
NSL = National Longitudinal Survey. 
*p5.05 
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specific skills are not readily available elsewhere, and to greater demand for 
educated workers who may adapt more readily to new technologies. The re- 
sults thus provide independent confirmation for the maintained hypothesis 
that steeply rising wage-tenure profiles reflect specific-training investments, 
and not just a pure incentive scheme. 
Comparable data on training are not available in Japan, which makes it 
difficult to verify the assertion that steeper wage-tenure profiles in Japan re- 
flect more intensive specific training in that country than in the United States. 
Anecdotal information, however, suggests that Japanese firms invest more 
heavily in the enterprise-specific skills of their workers. For example, in  a 
comparison of male workers in auto assembly plants in Detroit and Yoko- 
hama, Cole (1979) finds that Japanese workers received a higher proportion 
of  training courses that were company oriented as  compared to their U.S. 
counterparts. A recent study comparing U.S.  firms and Japanese firms oper- 
ating in the United States finds striking differences in their hiring and training 
practices (Mincer and Higuchi 1988). Compared to U.S. firms, Japanese firms 
in this country spend more on screening new hires, provide company training 
to a higher fraction of their American workforce (24% vs. 13%), and, consist- 
ent with the firm-specific training model, have wage-tenure profiles that are 
steeper than those found in the U.S. sample. 
Specific Training and Job-Match Quality 
The second problem is whether positive tenure-wage effects reflect specific- 
training returns or the quality of the job match. This issue is at the heart of 
several recent papers, including those by  Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and 
Abraham and Farber (1987). They argue that the positive cross-sectional as- 
sociation between job tenure and earnings does not imply additional increases 
in earnings with seniority over and above the returns to general work experi- 
ence, but may actually reflect the unobserved returns to a good job match. 
Indeed, the Abraham-Farber  results show that inclusion of a measure of com- 
pleted job duration (an instrument for job-match quality) substantially reduces 
the returns to job tenure. If  the effects of unobserved job-match quality are 
important, few inferences can be drawn from our wage models of the United 
States and Japan because of  potential omitted variable bias in the estimated 
tenure coefficients. 
The effects of job-match quality, however, may operate through the joint 
decisions of workers to get (and employers to provide) job training. A stan- 
dard prediction of human capital theory is that firm-specific training increases 
with expected time on the job N (or expected job duration) since there is a 
longer period  over which  to  amortize firm-specific investments costs.  A 
higher quality job match  (and longer N) should therefore also result in a 
greater likelihood of  firm-specific training, other things equal. Since job- 
match quality and training decisions are linked inextricably, it follows that the 
Abraham-Farber findings cannot be  interpreted as a rejection of  the firm- 402  Hong W.  Tan 
specific training hypothesis; they may  simply reflect the omission of  job- 
training measures. 
A recent paper by Tan (1988) follows this line of reasoning using compre- 
hensive training information contained in a matched January-March  1983 
sample of 4,660 males from the CPS. Two types of  training variables were 
considered: (1) “in-house training ,” which combined participation in company 
training programs and informal on-the-job training and (2) “outside training,” 
from all other external sources such as traditional schools, and business, and 
technical institutions. Training and earnings equations were estimated using a 
two-stage procedure suggested by Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (198 1). In 
essence, the procedure involved estimating separate probit models for each 
source of training and including their fitted values as instruments in the earn- 
ings model, which was then estimated by a two-stage least squares method. 
The specification of the wage model is similar to that used earlier, except that 
two indices of  TFP growth estimated by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni 
(1986) are used, one for the  1947-73  period, the other for 1973-79.  TFP 
growth was separated into two time periods to investigate whether long-run 
TFP or short-run TFP had a more important effect on current earnings growth. 
Table 13.6 presents selected results from the two-stage wage model and, for 
comparison, OLS regression results from a wage model with training treated 
as exogenously determined. Note that the size of  the tenure coefficient is re- 
duced dramatically from .026 to .0023 in the two-stage model, and the vari- 
able loses statistical significance. This result suggests that, if  the quality of 
the job match is responsible for the widely reported cross-sectional wage- 
tenure coefficient (as suggested by Abraham and Farber), it appears to operate 
entirely through worker and employer training decisions. If  this is the case, 
then  wage-tenure profiles  estimated  from  conventional cross-section data 
without training information may still provide a useful first approximation of 
investments in firm-specific training. 
Several other points are noteworthy. First, the effects of training on earnings 
are large, especially training from in-house sources. In going from the single 
equation to the two-stage results, not only do the coefficients on training in- 
crease, but their relative rankings change as well, so that in-house training 
increases earnings more than training from outside sources, which is more 
plausible. Secondly, consistent with the results reported earlier, the effects of 
technical  change  (1973-79)  on  wage-tenure  profiles  remain  largely  un- 
changed in the two-stage model, with lower starting wages and higher rates of 
wage-tenure growth in technologically progressive industries. In fact, the ef- 
fects of  TFP on wage-tenure growth becomes even larger, the tenure coeffi- 
cient rising from .0012 in the single equation model to .0019 in the two-stage 
model. Finally, contemporaneous earnings growth is only affected by recent 
TFP growth-the  interactions between long-run TFP growth and tenure are 
never statistically significant. This result is intuitively plausible if  older, vin- 
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Table 13.6  Selected Results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Wo-Stage 
Wage Models with lkaining 
Variable Names  OLS Model  Two-Stage Model 
Constant 
Years of  schooling 
Labor-market experience 
Experience* 
Years of tenure 
Tenure2 
TC 1947-73  X  tenure 
TC 1973-79 







-  .00147** 
.02614** 
-  .00043** 
,00711 
,00076 







-  .00089** 
,00227 
-  ,00004 
-  ,00857 
.00027 




Source: January-March  1983 matched Current Population Survey. 
Note:  Other control variables not reported here include race, location, and state unemployment 
rate. The  training probit models included marital status, categorical schooling indicators,  and 
training needed to get the current job as identifying variables. N = 4,171 observations; dependent 
variable is log-weekly wage (mean = 5.845). TC = technical change. 
*p=.05. 
**p<.lO. 
13.4  Summary and Conclusions 
The starting point of this paper was the proposition that many employment 
and wage practices found in the United States and in Japan may actually re- 
flect  rational  labor-market  responses  to  the  exigencies  of  technological 
change. New technologies, before they can be used effectively, require exten- 
sive modification and learning; less than optimal amounts of  learning may 
result because of the bilateral monopoly issue associated with these new and 
more productive specific skills. By clarifying the property rights of employers 
and workers to these efficiency gains, long-term employment relationships 
and seniority-based wage and promotion practices create a context that in- 
duces the appropriate investments in learning. By viewing the emergence of 
these institutions as demand induced, it follows that, where there was less 
need to develop technology-specific skills, these labor-market practices did 
not arise or were not retained. 
To  test this proposition, we presented a model of technology-specific skills 
that yielded several (refutable) predictions about the relationships between 
industry rates of technical change and output growth on one hand, and wage- 
tenure growth and schooling on the other. These predictions were tested using 
comparable labor-market data for the United States and Japan. The hypothe- 
ses were strongly supported in the U.S. sample, both in the aggregate and by 
firm size, and among Japanese workers employed in  large firms. The first 
hypothesis, that rapid technical change induces increased investments in spe- 404  Hong W.  Tan 
cific skills, found support in steeper rates of tenure-wage growth in technolog- 
ically more progressive industries. Holding the level of productivity growth 
constant, rapid output growth was  also associated with faster wage growth 
with tenure. A related hypothesis-that  better-educated workers have better 
“signal extraction” abilities-also  found support in  the positive interaction 
between schooling attainment and  technical change, but only in the U.S. 
sample. 
Several competing interpretations for the empirical findings were also eval- 
uated  using  information (some anecdotal) on training. Evidence was pre- 
sented for the United States that indicated that rapid technical change leads to 
increased  reliance  on  in-house  training-possibly  because  technology- 
specific skills are not readily available elsewhere-and  to a lower demand for 
training from outside sources. These findings were interpreted as providing 
independent confirmation for the hypothesis that steeply rising wage-tenure 
profiles reflect  specific-training investments, and  not  the  (pure) incentive 
schemes derived from implicit labor contract theories. The findings of several 
recent papers on job-match quality-which  indicated a potential bias in esti- 
mated wage-tenure profiles-were  also shown not to be inconsistent with a 
specific-training interpretation. Results were presented that suggest that the 
wage effects of job-match quality may actually operate through the joint deci- 
sions of  workers to get (and employers to provide) job training. By implica- 
tion, wage-tenure profiles estimated from conventional cross-sectional wage 
models without training information may provide a useful first approximation 
of  specific-training returns. 
Overall, the cross-national comparison has provided some insights into 
how  U.S. and Japanese Iabor markets operate to provide the human capital 
skills required for productivity growth. Surely, part of the Japanese success of 
rapid economic growth is attributable to more intensive job training, of both 
general and specific types, as revealed in higher returns to both general work 
experience and job tenure in Japan than in the United States. Our empirical 
analyses were successful in explaining only part of the systematic interindus- 
try and cross-national variation in wage profiles, and there, more successfully 
for the U.S. than for Japan. In this regard, the preliminary results reported 
here raise more questions than they answer. For example, how do we explain 
differences between the United States and Japan in the responsiveness of small 
and large firms to productivity growth? Why is schooling more productive in 
technologically progressive industries in the United States but not in Japan? 
Further refinement  and  tests  of  the  technology-specific skills  model  are 
needed to address these (and other) issues. 
Notes 
1.  For interested readers, Tan (1982) provides a comprehensive survey of the recent 
2.  The wage specification (and justification) used for the decomposition of earnings 
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into general training and specific training components is similar to that discussed in 
section 13.2. 
3.  Simultaneity might arise if the residual measure of TFP included specific training 
as one component of  unmeasured labor quality so that TFP and ST were positively 
correlated. This possibility of simultaneity bias was addressed by formulating a struc- 
tural model of ST and TFP, in which TFP is determined by ST  and  other inputs into the 
innovative process including the number of imported technology licenses, R&D spend- 
ing, investments in new  plant  and equipment, and research staff. Allowing for the 
endogenous determination of  ST and TFP reduced, but did not change, the positive 
effects of technical change on specific-training  investments. 
4. Semiannual bonuses are an important component (as much as one-third) of total 
wage compensation in Japan. Hashimoto (1979) argues that these bonus payments 
represent the worker's share of specific-training  returns. 
5. In the ESS ,  the variable for weekly hours worked is reported in broad categories 
that may result in  some (unknown) measurement error in the construction of  hourly 
wage rates. 
6. Unlike the CPS, where schooling attainment is continuous, this variable is cate- 
gorical: middle school (8 years), high school (12 years) and college (16 years) gradu- 
ates. 
7. I am grateful to Masahiro Kuroda for kindly providing unpublished estimates of 
industry rates of TFP  growth in Japan, as well as the input series used to create the TFP 
measures. Similar thanks go to F.  M. Gollop and D. W.  Jorgenson for the companion 
TFP series for the United States. 
8.  A problem (which we  discuss later) is that steeply rising wage-tenure profiles 
may also reflect wage schemes designed to reduce incentives to shirk (Lazear 1981) or 
to attract workers with low quit propensities (Salop and Salop 1976). 
9. This interaction term adds flexibility to the model specification since the returns 
to job tenure are allowed to vary with prior work experience. We  would expect lower 
investments in specific training for those with long prior experience since the remain- 
ing time on the current job is correspondingly shorter. 
10.  The TFP measures in that study referred to the period between 1966 and 1973, 
and were derived from Gollop and Jorgenson (1980). 
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Comment  Romesh Diwan 
1. The revised version of this paper has successfully incorporated some of 
the specific suggestions I made at the NBER conference where it was origi- 
nally read. There are still a number of issues that merit discussion. 
2. One of the basic limitations of the paper follows from the model itself. 
The  stated objective of  the  paper  is to  develop and  quantify a  model  of 
technology-specific skills in  order to explain differing, and different, labor 
market practices. However, in its final form, the model in Tan’s equation (1) 
ends up in attempting to explain partial changes in wage profiles by  three 
factors that measure labor quality, namely, (i) level of education, (ii) level and 
growth in prior job experience, and (iii) level and growth in the job, that is, 
experience with a particular employer or tenure. The model is able to explain 
only partial changes in wage profiles because it is not based on any theories of 
supply of or demand for labor. The statistical results confirm this partial ex- 
planation. 
3. In equation (2),  the model is augmented by the introduction of technical 
change and industrial growth, both factors existing at the industry level while 
the rest of the model is at the firdenterprise level. Technical change is mea- 
sured by total factor productivity (TFP) at the industry level. The estimated 
single equation in table 13.2 is given a selective translog form. Thus, there 
are variables for experience2  and tenure2  but no term for schooling2.  Similarly, 
there are interaction terms: experience  X  tenure, TFP  X  schooling, TFP x 
tenure, IGR  X  tenure, but there are no variables for schooling x experience, 
TFP  X  experience, IGR  X  experience; IGR  X  schooling. Again, there are 
two additional variables for TFP-tenure squared and IGR-tenure squared. It is 
not clear, or explained, why  some square and interaction variables are in- 
cluded and others omitted. 
There are two sets of problems here. One, the selective use of the translog 
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form has resulted in the omission of a number of interaction variables. Unless 
the interaction effects are small, such omission has the effect of biasing the 
estimated coefficients. Fortunately, the value of the interaction effects, as es- 
timated below, are quite small. Two, measurement of TFP poses all sorts of 
difficulties, conceptual as well as quantitative. By  and large, TFP has been 
estimated as a “residual” so that it is highly sensitive to model specification. 
As a residual, TFP can be meaningfully interpreted only with the reference to 
the model of which it is a residual. To treat TFP as a variable, in and of itself, 
even if  it has been estimated by  experts such as Gollop and Jorgenson and 
Kuroda, is to stretch the argument, the logic, and the estimates a little too far. 
4. Given the selective translog form, one can develop an alternative inter- 
pretation of the estimated parameters. In view of the square and cross-product 
terms in the estimated equation, one can distinguish the followingfour effects: 
(i)  first-order effects, (ii)  second-order effects associated with  the  square 
terms, (iii) interaction effects derived from cross-product terms, and (iv) total 
effect, which is the sum of the three effects. We  have calculated these four 
effects for the tenure variable for both the United States and Japan. These are 
given in table 1. 
These calculations suggest that the totality of interaction effects are similar 
for both the United States and Japan. Furthermore, these effects are rather 
small. The major effect is given by the first-order term. 
5. There are two stories that we in the United States tell to each other: one 
about United States and the other about Japan. The story about the United 
States is that it does not pay to stick with one firm or company. Instead, one 
gains in wages/salaries by regularly switching jobs from one company to the 
other. Based on the market philosophy, the “theory of  exit” is recognized, 
respected, and well practiced. There is ample evidence to prove it. 
The story about Japan that we tell in the United States is just the opposite. 
In Japan it pays to stick with one company. One does not gain in wages/sala- 
ries by switching  jobs from one company to the other. Instead, job switching 
is discouraged. The celebration in Japan is of lifetime employment with one 
company. The theory that is practiced is of  “loyalty,” not of  “exit.” Quite a 
large number of experts have written about it. 
The story that emerges from these results is that the wage changes are most 
Table 1  First-Order, Second-Order, Interaction, and Total Effects of Tenure 
Effects 
Country  First Order  Second Order  Interaction  Total 
~ 
United States  ,038  -  .0048  -  ,0050  ,0282 
Japan  ,057  -  ,0097  -  ,0048  .0425 
Nore: The second-order effects and interaction effects have been calculated at the average values 
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affected by  the initial situation, whether it is prior experience or job tenure. 
Given the initial situation, additions to years in tenure and/or a combination 
of tenure with other qualitative variables does not help in the rate of change of 
the wage rate. These results conform with the story about the United States. 
They seem to be at odds with the story about Japan. These results point out to 
the similarities rather than differences between the United States and Japan. 
Given much  of  the  information about the differences between the United 
States and Japan, these results suggest that the search is not over. 